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Summary: This paper gauges the degree of fiscal vulnerability in Turkey from a Minskian perspective. Succinctly speaking, 
Minsky’s financial stability hypothesis states that the government should apply hedge financing at least sporadically and 
pursue countercyclical fiscal policies to restore stability. We calculated two fiscal fragility indices based on Minsky’s 
hypothesis to examine the recent trends in Turkish public finances. According to our findings, Turkish fiscal balances are in 
a deteriorating trend and heading towards (ultra)Ponzi financing which is evidenced by the plummeting values of the fiscal 
fragility index. The results are suggestive that currently the fiscal performance in Turkey is waning gradually and current fiscal 
posture is not on a par with past years. Worsening fiscal balances emit a signal for a looming fiscal crisis and it is evident 
that this trend should promptly be reversed by the aid of appropriate expedients. Quitting the use of procyclical fiscal policies, 
building up public confidence by primary balance generation, implementing full-fledged tax reform, restructuring contingent 
liabilities, proper scrutiny of expenditures, reducing profligacy are among the policy options available for the government. 
Notwithstanding the abundance of alternative fiscal policies, the current Covid-19 pandemic is quite a hindrance to attaining 
intended outcomes regarding fiscal stability.
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The dynamics of modern capitalism rely 
chiefly on the mechanisms of the financial 
system, therefore, any adversity in this field 
creates a vulnerability that permeates all 
sectors of the economy swiftly. Financing 
effectuates investments but at the same time 
might generate a debt vortex through the 
credit channel. However, it is almost inevitable 
for all economic units, such as firms and 
government, to borrow in the financial market 
to overcome existing economic bottlenecks 
or to pursue new investments. According to 
Minsky’s taxonomy, the economic fluctuations 
occur as an outcome of the intertwinement 
between financial markets and the economic 
activities of units. The availability of financial 
resources is affected by the cycles of the 
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overall economy but at the same, the amount 
of available financing is determined by the 
expansions or recession in the economy. 
Hence, a malfunctioning financial mechanism 
brings about the vulnerability of each agent in 
the economy. 
Although Minsky outlined this framework 
to describe the financial instability for 
all economic units in general, it was later 
expanded to government level to contemplate 
the fiscal vulnerability of public finances. 
Nevertheless, Minsky himself states that the 
fiscal policies of the government need to be 
countercyclical to reduce vulnerability by 
putting aside part of the existing financing 
for avoiding future challenges. However, 
financing a countercyclical fiscal policy 
oftentimes entails the use of a significant 
amount of financial resources which is 
generally challenging for developing 
countries. During exceptional periods like 
the Covid-19 pandemic, it is also difficult 
even for developed economies to finance 
the economy in a countercyclical manner. 
Printing money and enlarging the monetary 
base is an option available for countries but 
the governments should apply this policy 
intermittently since it has serious side 
effects as well. Developed economies whose 
currency represents a store of wealth in the 
international circulation have a comparative 
advantage regarding this policy since their 
currencies have international liquidity. 
Hence, they can utilize this advantage and 
increase the volume of emission without 
suffering from serious side effects such as 
inflation. 
According to Minsky, the government’s 
fiscal balance should be in the surplus from 
time to time and long and consecutive periods 
of speculative financing culminates in a 
confidence loss against the government in 
the economy which is crucial for developing 
economies. If the economic agents’ confidences 
regarding future path of fiscal balances and 
governments’ ability to swing between the 
hedge and speculative posture shrinks, the 
demand for government bonds falls and 
thereby interest rates rise which results in a 
fiscal fragility and reduced credibility.
In the recent years, the fiscal posture in 
Turkey suffers from these adverse conditions 
and deteriorates gradually in a spiral of 
diminishing confidence, increasing borrowing 
needs, rising interest rates and intensifying 
fiscal vulnerability. Thus, it is the very purpose 
of this study to investigate the degree of fiscal 
vulnerability in Turkey by testing the Minsky’s 
financial instability hypothesis using Turkish 
data. According to our findings, Turkish 
government finance is currently Ponzi and 
heading towards an ultra-Ponzi scheme which 
translates into extreme financial vulnerability 
and a signal for a looming default. Besides, 
Turkey has been classified in 'The Fragile 
Five Economies' category by S&P. Hence, 
the current unpleasant conditions in Turkish 
public finances and inherent structural fiscal 
issues render the country a remarkable case 
to investigate. This study contributes to the 
literature by appraising the fiscal vulnerability 
in Turkey for the first time by using Minsky’s 
financial instability hypothesis.
To accomplish this objective the study 
is developed in four sections following this 
introduction:
The first section discusses the theoretical 
issues related to Minsky’s hypothesis and its 
adaptation to public finance. The second 
section is devoted to a comprehensive review 
of the literature on fiscal vulnerability. The 
third section deals with the empirical issues 
and introduces the methodology and findings 
obtained by constructing the public financial 
fragility index. The final section concludes 
and provides some words of caveat related 
to the risks associated with fiscal fragility in 
Turkey. 
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BACkGrouNd 
Theoretical Background
Classical economics assumes that the economy 
is a sustainable system that constantly seeks 
equilibrium. However, some historical events 
have proven that the classic principles of Adam 
Smith and Léon Walras are not always valid. 
Anomalies such as financial crises and severe 
fluctuations in production and employment 
are phenomena that cannot be explained by 
Classical theory properly (Minsky, 1977: 21). 
From this point of view, Minsky’s financial 
instability hypothesis is an interpretation of 
the essence of Keynes’ The General Theory 
of Employment, Interest, and Money which 
incorporates disequilibrium into the analysis, 
unlike Classics. Another origin of the 
Minskian hypothesis is Joseph Schumpeter Key’s 
credit view of money and finance. The main 
theoretical argument of this hypothesis is the 
characterization of the economy as a capitalist 
economy consisting of expensive capital assets 
and a complex financial system (Minsky, 
1992: 1-2). According to Minsky, processes 
creating financial fragility are natural or 
endogenous to the economic system described 
in Schumpeter’s tradition.
To put it simply, Minsky’s theory is based 
on the financing dynamics of the investment. 
Investments can only expand if the demand 
price exceeds the supply price of capital assets. 
In that case, investment decisions are made 
according to the composition of the capital and 
financial asset portfolios. When an economic 
unit creates a financial asset portfolio, it also 
creates a debt structure. Hence, an economic 
unit expects monetary profit from the 
composition of its asset portfolio as soon as 
its investment is financed. In other words, 
the income expected from the investment 
must counterpoise the current expenses of the 
organization as well as interest and depreciation 
expenses thereof. Stabilitywise, extending this 
argument to the entire financial system, we can 
infer that the extent to which the expectations 
of investors and creditors match determines 
the degree of financial fragility in the financial 
system. The difference between the expected 
revenues of economic units and their financial 
payments is expressed as a safety margin and 
the economic position of the relevant unit will 
be different depending on its value (Ferrari-
Filho et al., 2010: 152-153). Hence, financing 
creates a bond between expected revenue 
and obligatory debt reimbursements. For the 
economic unit to be solvent and financially 
safe, the former needs to be higher than the 
latter. Thus, any institutional or cyclical factor 
hindering the manifestation of the expectations 
regarding the revenues creates a source for 
financial vulnerability. The size of the safety 
margin defined above determines the types 
of a financial posture of the economic agent. 
There are three postures in Minsky’s taxonomy 
regarding fiscal fragility; Hedge, Speculative 
and Ponzi which will be discussed in the next 
section.
Conceptual Background
The word 'fragility' is mostly used to 
describe financial markets in the economic 
literature. This concept is linked to the 
soundness of the economy in the face of 
economic uncertainties arising from cyclical 
fluctuations, extraordinary events, and shocks. 
In the literature, there are other terminologies 
to describe the same or similar negative 
economic situations and none of them have 
been universally accepted by academics. For 
instance, in the public finance literature, 
'fiscal fragility', 'fiscal vulnerability', 'fiscal 
stress', or 'public sector financial fragility' are 
commonly used terms to describe the same 
concept interchangeably. 
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One of the early definitions of fiscal fragility 
proposed by Hemming and Petrie (2000: 159) 
identifies the concept as a situation in which 
a government already maintains inappropriate 
fiscal policies, or it cannot improve the quality 
of policies immediately. Brixi et al. (2000: 8) 
expresses the fiscal vulnerability as the capacity 
of a government to resist the realization of 
future fiscal risks. They also underline that any 
government expenditures, which brings about 
a rise in its payment obligations, could lead to 
excessive budget deficits and public debt stock 
in the long term.
Even though Minsky preferred the term 
'financial instability' instead of 'financial 
fragility' in the original version of the 
hypothesis (Minsky, 1982), Ferrari-Filho et al. 
(2010), one of our reference articles, used the 
word 'fragility' when adapting this hypothesis 
to public finance, therefore, we follow their 
tradition as well. 
Before starting the technical and theoretical 
discussion of this hypothesis it is worthwhile 
to describe the three financial postures of 
economic units from financial stability 
perspective which were also included in the 
original version of the hypothesis. Namely, 
these three concepts are: (1) Hedge, (2) 
Speculative, and (3) Ponzi. 
Firstly, an economic unit which is expecting 
its cash inflows to exceed its cash payments 
makes a 'hedge finance'. Economic units in 
the hedging position can easily counterbalance 
the interest payments, debt amortizations 
and current expenses. Therefore, these units 
have a good safety margin. The amount of 
debt decreases gradually and they are guarded 
against fluctuations in their liquidity flows. 
Hence, they can fulfil their above-mentioned 
obligatory expenses without suffering from 
borrowing needs. Secondly, in a speculative 
position, the cash inflows of an economic 
unit are less than its liabilities due in some 
occasional periods. Their revenues are only 
sufficient to cover interest payments on their 
debts. However, they are incapable of paying 
off debt principals. Hence, speculative units 
are those with a minor safety margin. The 
economic units are meant to stay in this 
posture for short periods for implementing 
new investment plans. Therefore, the debt 
level might increase in the short run but they 
expect stability in the long run. However, 
unlike hedge posture, the recovery is 
contingent on economic conditions. Thirdly, 
economic units in the Ponzi position are 
extremely speculative. These economic units 
cannot cover the principal payments, interest 
payments and current expenses therefore need 
to borrow on a continuous basis (Minsky, 
1986: 79; Ferrari-Filho et al., 2010: 153-154). 
Also, they cannot generate a safety margin 
using their revenues. For them to generate a 
safety margin, the only way is to trade their 
existing assets. Usually their debt snowballs 
due to the incessantly rising interest payments 
which aggravates their already vulnerable 
situation.
According to Minsky, movement between 
these postures occurs as a result of cyclical 
fluctuations in the economy. If there is a 
boom in the economy, with the expectation 
of more gains, entrepreneurs are encouraged 
to make new investments assuming that the 
good atmosphere will persist in the economy. 
Since banks have the same intention of 
raising their revenue, they finance the new 
investments extensively which moves the 
economy from hedge to speculative posture. 
Nevertheless, when the existing resources 
are depleted, financing costs get higher and 
credit becomes scarce. Investments and 
revenues fall and eventually, the economy 
moves from speculative posture to Ponzi 
financing. However, according to Minsky, 
this transition between fiscal postures can 
be reversed through countercyclical fiscal 
policies.
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From a public financial perspective, 
Minsky’s theory is based on the Keynesian 
paradigm. According to that, it should 
reciprocate to the fluctuations in the economy 
by means of countercyclical policies. Minsky 
states that refraining from employing 
countercyclical policies might result in 
heightened financial vulnerability and might 
consequently lead to an economic downturn. 
According to him, the economy must be 
in a Hedge position when investors ignite 
the economy and create an expansion, and 
conversely when the potential risks surge 
in the economy, the economy heads toward 
speculative postures. The government can 
accumulate reserve resources to avoid future 
financial scarcities when there is a boom so 
as to enlarge it is the safety margin. Hedge 
financing escalates confidence in the fiscal 
posture of the government which is crucial 
for the credibility of the government. Higher 
credibility implies facilitated borrowing should 
the government need financing. In addition, 
unlike speculative and Ponzi financing, Hedge 
posture avoids excessive borrowing which 
reduces the pressure on inflation and interest 
rates and thereby decreases the likelihood of a 
surge in financial vulnerability. 
Besides these three concepts, it is worthy to 
mention some relevant concepts such as 'ultra-
Ponzi' and 'Minsky moment'. The term of ultra-
Ponzi was initially used in Argitis & Nikolaidi 
(2014: 276). It can be defined as the inability 
to cover the government’s primary expenditures 
without new borrowing let al.one the existing 
debt and interest compounding thereon. The 
safety margin of an economic unit with an 
ultra-Ponzi posture is at the lowest level. 
The concept of Minsky moment came about 
with the 2008 global crisis. This concept refers 
to the transition from the speculative position 
to the Ponzi position. It can also be defined as 
the razor’s edge situation between fragility and 
stability. 
LiTErATurE rEviEW 
Based on the signal approach, Baldacci et 
al. (2011A) generate a fiscal stress index to 
assess fiscal sustainability in developed and 
developing economies covering the period 
starting with the mid-1990s. They note that 
the periods of fiscal stress occur when the 
public debt is unpaid or when the country 
is prone to default. According to their 
findings, after the global crisis, the financial 
stress in developed countries increased to 
unprecedented levels due to their solvency and 
financing needs, whereas the financial stresses 
of developing countries are lower compared to 
developed countries. However the level is still 
higher than before the crisis for all countries. 
Referring to the signal approach of Baldacci 
et al. (2011A), Berti et al. (2012) argue that 
the variables of financial competition perform 
better in timely detection of fiscal stress. 
Accordingly, they put forward a composite 
indicator including both fiscal and financial 
competition variables. Đurović-Todorović 
et al. (2017) discuss Serbia’s fiscal stress for 
the period from 2007 to 2014 with a signal 
approach. The results indicate that public debt 
is excessively higher than the threshold level 
which indicates a sign of a financial crisis for 
the Serbian public sector.
Baldacci et al. (2011B) designed two 
indices to examine the fiscal fragility. The first 
one is the fiscal vulnerability index based on 
the signal approach and the second one is the 
fiscal stress index based on standardization. 
The results demonstrate that both indices 
rose for developed economies, and the fiscal 
situation for emerging economies weakened 
after the crisis. In a study conducted for Turkey 
for the period from 1989 to 2017, Canoz & 
Marufoglu (2018) submit a fiscal fragility index 
by referring to the standardization method of 
Baldacci et al. (2011B). The findings indicate 
that the index correctly predicted past crises 
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and warningly moved towards the crisis 
threshold between 2015 and 2017.
Stoian (2011) reports the vulnerable 
periods of fiscal policy for the 27 EU member 
states from 1970 to 2012. For this purpose, 
the author presents a new methodology for 
evaluating fiscal vulnerability by referring to 
the event studies approach proposed by Fama et 
al. (1969). The results reveal that EU countries 
have had a vulnerable fiscal policy during the 
relevant period. Another study, Stoian (2012), 
examines the vulnerability of the fiscal policy 
of 10 Central and Eastern European countries 
for the period from 1996 to 2010 using the 
same method. They conclude that the fiscal 
policies of all countries except Bulgaria and 
Estonia are vulnerable to fiscal stress. 
Stoian et al. (2015) develop a new 
methodology named V-L-D to identify the 
short-term vulnerabilities of fiscal policy 
for EU member countries. It ranks the 
vulnerability in four categories from lowest 
(1) to highest (4). According to the results, 
a total of 310 financial vulnerability periods 
are determined. Of these, 128 are low 
vulnerability, 94 are medium vulnerability, 
62 are high vulnerability, and 26 are an 
extremely high vulnerability. Stoian et al. 
(2018) carry out another study with the 
same method for EU member countries for 
the period from 2004 to 2013. They find 
that Greece, Portugal, Romania, the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, and Slovenia are the 
most financially vulnerable countries. Citing 
the V-L-D method of Stoian et al. (2018), 
Guler (2018) examines the fiscal vulnerability 
of Turkey for the period from 1990 to 2013. 
In this paper, a fiscal vulnerability index 
calculated for Turkey is compared with EU 
countries. According to the results, Turkey 
has an improvement in the fiscal vulnerability 
indicators after 2000, but when considering 
the whole period Turkey’s fiscal vulnerability 
is still high. 
By adapting the Minskian hypothesis to 
public finance, Ferrari-Filho et al. (2010) 
derive an index of financial fragility for 
Brazil’s public sector from 2000 to 2008. They 
conclude that the fiscal structure of Brazil 
was speculative in the period from 2000 to 
2008. Their results indicate that public debt 
increased during this period, and it became 
difficult for the Brazilian government to 
pursue fiscal policies. Similarly, Minsky’s 
hypothesis is used by Terra & Ferrari-Filho 
(2020) in a recent study for Brazil. This 
research covers a wider period from 2000 to 
2016 and uses three versions of the index to 
evaluate Brazil’s public finances. According 
to the results, the Brazilian government is 
speculative in its borrowing requirements 
from 2000 to 2013, but it is under the Ponzi 
regime from 2014 to 2016. Nikolaidi (2014) 
estimates an index of financial fragility for the 
Greek public sector for the period from 2001 
to 2009 by referencing Minsky’s hypothesis. 
The results imply that the Greek public sector 
was under the Ponzi regime between 2001 and 
2002 and in later years, it was under the ultra-
Ponzi regime. Also, based on this hypothesis, 
Argitis & Nikolaidi (2014) establish a 
financial fragility index for the public sector 
of Greece between 1988 and 2012. They 
focus on the relationship between the public 
sector’s cash inflows and outflows to derive the 
index. The authors criticize the ineffectiveness 
of the Greek government’s programs to meet 
its loan commitments and ensure its financial 
sustainability. According to the results, the 
Greek public sector has been under an ultra-
Ponzi regime since 2003. In another study, 
based on the same hypothesis and conducted 
once again for Greece, Beshenov & Rozmainsky 
(2015) examine how the behavior of public 
and private sectors led to the debt crisis. 
When the public sector side of the research is 
examined, Greek bonds, which lost their value 
after 2009, impelled the country to enter a 
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debt spiral by increasing the borrowing costs. 
Besides, the policies implemented by the 
Greek government to exit this debt spiral were 
insufficient.
Jędrzejowicz & Koziński (2012) aim to 
assess Poland’s fiscal vulnerability. To achieve 
this objective, they concentrate on five key 
public finance issues, such as (1) the level of 
public debt, (2) medium-term dynamics of 
public debt, (3) long-term sustainability of 
public debt, (4) public debt management and 
government liquidity, and (5) fiscal rules and 
institutions. Using this framework, they claim 
that Poland’s vulnerability to fiscal risks was 
very limited after the 2008-2009 global crisis 
and that fiscal imbalances against public debt 
accumulation must be corrected.
A MiNSkiAN ExPLorATioN iNTo 
THE PoSTurE oF TurkiSH PuBLiC 
FiNANCES
Based on the viewpoint of the theoretical 
considerations in the preceding section, 
this section appraises the course of fiscal 
sturdiness in Turkey over the recent history 
based on the postulates of Minsky’s financial 
instability hypothesis. To accomplish this 
objective, it is worthwhile to briefly touch 
upon the formulation of the basic tenets of 
the hypothesis to methodologically embody 
the conceptual framework outlined in the 
previous section. Also, to gauge the fiscal 
fragility based on financial data, it is essential 
to build up a profound tool that serves the 
purpose of standardizing the decision rule 
for analytically testing whether the country 
is engaging in hedge, speculative or Ponzi 
financing. In this sense, Filho et al. (2010) is a 
seminal contribution to the literature since the 
authors adapt the Minsky’s financial fragility 
hypothesis into the context of public finance. 
Thus, we start this section with the formal 
derivation of the fiscal fragility index based on 
this adaptation methodology.
Embodying the Fiscal Fragility Concept: 
Fiscal Fragility Index
In order to gauge the fiscal performance of 
Turkey in recent decades in terms of fragility, 
we borrow the formulation of the fiscal fragility 
index formulation in Filho et al. (2010) which 
is predicated on Minsky’s financial fragility 
taxonomy. Their approach is to a large extent 
based on the government cash flow which is 
comprised of its total revenue and expenditure 
which can be partitioned into current and 
financial expenditures. Financial expenditures 
are comprised of interest payments and debt 
amortization spending. Using this terminology, 
three postures (Hedge, Speculative and Ponzi) 
of Minsky’s hypothesis described in the 
previous section can be adapted to the context 
of public finance as follows:
Hedge position, which guarantees fiscal 
stability by securing a cash margin to shun 
adverse effects of unexpected surges in 
expenditures or similar type of falls in the 
revenues, occurs when total revenues of the 
government sector exceed the total value of 
current and financial expenditures. In Filho et 
al. (2010) this situation is formally represented 




Rk : Capital Revenue
Rof : Revenue (Other Sources)
G: Current Expenses
Ga: Financial Amortization Expenses
Gi: Interest Payments
Using the same notation, they formulate 
the speculative fiscal posture as;
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(T + Rk + Rof) – G < Ga + Gi (2)
In this case, total revenues surpass only 
current expenditures and are not sufficiently 
large to cover the financial expenditures of the 
government. Unlike hedge posture, speculative 
posture does not secure a safety margin for the 
government against unanticipated financial 
hardships since the revenues are not capable 
of covering the expenses in full. Hence, 
speculative posture compels the government 
to at least partially make use of borrowing 
instruments to avoid public default in the short 
run. Also, in the medium term, some policy 
alterations in the form of tax hikes or spending 
cuts become inevitable for the fiscal authorities 
so as to transform the existing speculative 
position into a more reliable hedge context 
and thereby avoid the potential downswings 
in the fiscal balances of the country. 
The third and the most undesirable fiscal 
posture is the so-called Ponzi scheme. In this 
scenario, the government cannot even cover 
the current spending let al.one the financial 
expenditures. As a result, the interest payments 
and debt amortization expenditures halt which 
causes public debt to snowball. Such a fiscal 
context is obviously insolvent and requires 
continuous debt restructuring as a result of 
shrinking sovereign credibility and increasing 
borrowing needs. The Ponzi fiscal posture 
jeopardizes the overall economic stability 
by crowding-out the private investments 
and creating a 'doom loop' between higher 
borrowing needs higher interest rates, higher 
cost of debt financing and higher taxation. 
This procedure is eventually followed by a 
debt overhang which poses a disincentive 
for new investors and consumers since it 
is clear that the sole benefiter of the future 
primary balances will be the existing creditors. 
Also, when the debt level keeps mounting 
incessantly, the fiscal space of the government 
budget gets narrower and consequently, 
government falls short of sufficient financing 
should an unforeseen downturn occur in the 
economy. Filho et al. (2010) formally describes 
this posture as follows;
(T + Rk + Rof) – (p)G > (1 – p)G + Ga + Gi (3)
where p denotes the portion of current 
expenditures covered by government revenues. 
According to this formula, the Ponzi posture 
dramatically restricts the fiscal manoeuvrability 
and the government can only finance part of 
the current expenditures which are mandatory 
but fails to defray financial obligations such 
as interest payments and debt amortizations 
which emits a signal for a looming default for 
the economy. 
Depending on the circumstances in the 
economy, the fiscal posture of the country 
takes one of these three forms. Public financial 
management malfunctionalities, international 
crises, pandemics, economic environment, etc. 
collectively determine the level of fiscal fragility 
ranging from hedge to Ponzi as described 
above. However, in order to spot the location of 
the country on the fiscal fragility palette (from 
hedge to Ponzi), we need to quantify a decision 
rule by calculating an index using the data on 
fiscal balances. By using the formulations above, 
Filho et al. (2010) creates a 'Public Finance 
Fragility Index' as articulated below.
Formally, equilibrium occurs when the 
following condition holds;
(T + Rk + Rof) – G = Ga + Gi (4)
Dividing each side with we get;
(Tr + Rk + Rof) – G
 =1 (5)
(Ga + Gi)
This equation represents the fiscal fragility 
index. Using this index, the three postures 
described above can be formulated as follows:
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Hedge posture occurs when;
(Tr + Rk + Rof) – G
 >1 (6)
(Ga + Gi)
Speculative posture occurs when;
(Tr + Rk + Rof) – G
 <1 (7)
(Ga + Gi)
Ponzi posture which is a special case of 
speculative posture occurs when;
(Tr + Rk + Rof) – G
 <0 (8)
(Ga + Gi)
To appraise the level of fiscal fragility in 
Turkey, we calculated two fiscal fragility 
indices using two different data sets based on 
the formulation above which is inspired by 
Minsky’s financial fragility hypothesis. The first 
index is calculated using the budget execution 
data which involves government revenues and 
expenditures as described above.  The second 
index also has the same underlying reasoning 
but it utilizes borrowing requirements data 
instead. The second index was introduced 
by Terra et al. (2020) in an attempt to 
enhance the argument of fiscal fragility more 
comprehensively. In this version of the index, 
they use the ratio of primary balance to the 
interest expenditures to build up the index.
For our analysis, the underlying reason for 
calculating the index with these two different 
approaches is twofold: First, the primary 
balance and interest expenditures data provided 
by the Turkish Treasury which are used for 
the second index cover a much larger time 
span (1990-2020) allowing interpretations 
of the fiscal stability in the 90s and early 
2000s while the budget execution data used 
for the first index solely covers the period 
2006 onwards. Thus, to enlarge the scope of 
analysis, we calculated the fiscal fragility index 
with primary balance data as well as budget 
execution data. Secondly, following the logic 
introduced by Terra et al. (2020), testing the 
hypothesis with two data sets permits a more 
comprehensive analysis along with the inter-
verification of the implications of each other 
since they test the same variable using different 
components of the government budget. Thus, 
the 2006-2020 sections of the two data sets 
allow for a comparative analysis of fiscal 
fragility in Turkey by means of two indices 
calculated with different approaches. 
Salient Features of  the Data
As mentioned in the previous section, we 
calculated two different versions of the 
fiscal fragility index using two different data 
sets. The data used for the first index is the 
'General Budget Balance and Financing Data 
Set' published by the Turkish Ministry of 
Treasury and Finance. The budget execution 
details are provided within this data set and 
we subtracted the current expenditures from 
total revenues and divided the result with the 
summation of debt amortization and interest 
payment expenditures to obtain the value for 
the fiscal fragility index. 
The second index was calculated using 
the 'Consolidated Budget Realisations' data set 
published also by the Turkish Ministry of 
Treasury and Finance. Following the Terra 
et al. (2020) approach, we used this dataset 
to calculate the fiscal fragility index which is 
represented by the ratio of primary balance 
to the interest payments. This borrowing 
requirements approach to fiscal fragility index 
excludes debt amortization payments and 
financial revenues from the equation and tests 
the ability of the government to cover interest 
payments through primary balance. Hence, 
this type of fiscal fragility index constitutes a 
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good proxy for the first fiscal fragility index 
and at the same time provides insightful results 
despite its lower data requirements. 
In addition to the fiscal data described 
above, we retrieved the data for two more 
indicators from the IMF database, namely 
annual CPI and annual GDP growth rate. 
We used the CPI values for deflating all fiscal 
series to neutralize the effect of inflation on 
nominal values. Since the consumption is only 
a fraction of the GDP, the CPI values might 
lack some aspects of  total GDP but despite its 
partial coverage it can still be used as a proxy 
for GDP deflator to neutralize the effect of 
inflation. Finally, we used the GDP growth 
rate series to determine the type of fiscal policy 
the Turkish government has pursued each year. 
According to Terra et al. (2020), if the fiscal 
stance of the country exhibit characteristics 
of a hedge posture and positive GDP growth 
simultaneously, then, the undertaken fiscal 
policy is deemed countercyclical, whereas, if the 
GDP growth period coexists with a speculative 
or Ponzi fiscal posture, then, the fiscal policy 
in that particular period is considered as 
procyclical. Hence, we use the GDP growth 
series to determine the type of cyclicality of the 
undertaken fiscal policies.  
Now that we have listed the variables 
we used for the analysis, it is worthwhile to 
evaluate the prominent trends in the data so 
as to facilitate the interpretation of the fiscal 
fragility index in the next section. 
The Figure 1 illustrates the budget revenue 
and expenditure realizations in Turkey between 
2006 and 2020. The data for 2020 covers the 
January – August period. It can clearly be seen 
on the graph that the financial expenditures 
follow a stable pattern throughout the sample 
whereas current expenditures and total 
revenues exhibit a positive trend. The impact of 
the 2008-2009 economic crisis is quite visible 
on the graph with rapidly falling revenues and 
rising expenditures. Another prominent point 
to make about the graph is that, even though 
the 2020 data covers only eight months, the 
current and financial expenditures are already 
higher than that of the entire 2019. This 
clearly proves that the Covid-19 pandemic has 
already resulted in a severe deterioration in 
public finances in Turkey. Also, the downward 
trend in total revenues in the recent years and 
upward movement in the current expenditures 
jointly indicate that the country is heading 
towards a Ponzi posture in public finances 
caused by skyrocketing health expenditures 
and social transfers. 
The Figure 2 depicts the primary balance 
and interest payments data which are used for 
the calculation of the second index of fiscal 
fragility in our analysis. During the late 90s, 
Turkey faced a severe economic crisis caused by 
a combination of several factors including long-
lasting conflicts in domestic politics, short-
living governments, the Asian crisis, devastating 
earthquakes, etc. As a result of these factors, at 
the end of this decade, the inflation level hit 
record high levels and consequently interest 
payments topped out during this period leading 
to a far-reaching adverse impact on the fiscal 
balances in Turkey. Extremely high interest 
expenditures coupled with the short maturity 
structure of the debt portfolio narrowed the 
fiscal space in the country dramatically and as 
a result, the budget lost all of its social policy 
tool traits since it was no longer controllable. 
The primary balance during this period was 
also remarkably low which gave rise to drastic 
borrowing needs since the fiscal reaction created 
by the primary balance against mounting public 
debt was quite shallow and therefore the debt 
servicing and rollover were not feasible with its 
own resources which created an ever-increasing 
borrowing requirement. 
However, at the beginning of the new 
decade, the single-party government performed 
remarkably well in terms of primary balance 
generation under the supervision of IMF 
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which can be seen on the early 2000s section 
of the Figure 2. Strong adherence to the IMF 
program also resulted in overall recovery in 
the economy and public finances, evidenced 
by swiftly falling inflation rates and interest 
expenditures. Not surprisingly, the two series 
on the Figure 2 are nearest to each other during 
this decade indicating a strong fiscal posture 
by the time. Despite the fact that this period 
does not represent a hedge posture for fiscal 
balances in Turkey since the primary balance 
line is still below the interest expenditures line, 
they are very close to each other which results 
in an index value which is close to unity. 
Notwithstanding the remarkable perfor-
mance of the government during the first two-
thirds of the decade, during the remaining 
third of the decade the same level of fiscal 
success could not have been achieved by the 
government and primary balance departed 
from its rising trend and exhibited a downward 
movement instead and eventually hit the zero 
level at the end of the decade. The remarkable 
fall in the fiscal performance of the country 
in terms of primary balance generation can 
at least partially be attributed to the global 
financial crisis but it is clear that the primary 
balance was already declining before the year 
global crisis hit the world economy. Also, in 
the post-crisis episodes, the primary balance 
generation strength is not on a par with the 
early 2000s level thereof which indicates a clear 
divergence from the fiscal discipline that was 
exerted during the early years of the decade. 
In recent years, this unpleasant trend in 
the fiscal policy design is more vividly visible 
on the Figure 2. Even though the interest 
expenditures keep falling steadily, the primary 
Figure 1
Budget execution data
Source: Turkish Ministry of Treasury and Finance
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balance hits negative levels after some 25 
years of positivity which is a prominent signal 
for a worsening fiscal context in the Turkish 
economy. Some of the grounds for weakening 
fiscal performance include the failed coup 
attempt in 2016, war in neighbour countries, 
international conflicts, depreciation of TL 
against other currencies and increasing fiscal 
profligacy in the country. Failing to reverse 
this path of the primary balance might have 
economic effects permeating all sectors of 
the economy swiftly through the channels of 
snowballing public debt since primary balance 
appears to be far from trimming the adverse 
movements in public debt movements. 
Coupled with the adverse economic effects of 
Covid-19, the fiscal outlook of the country 
is likely to encounter even harsher economic 
conditions in the near future. 
Appraising the Fiscal Fragility in Turkey 
via Public Financial Fragility Index 
In the final section, we evaluate the evolution 
of fiscal fragility in Turkey by means of the 
index described in the preceding sections 
which serves the purpose of embodying 
the fiscal fragility concept. The Figure 3 
depicts the values of the fiscal fragility index 
calculated using the budget execution data. 
The index values measure the capability of the 
government to cover the financial expenses 
through total revenue and current expenditure 
differential. It can clearly be observed on the 
graph that the highest value was achieved in 
2006. As mentioned in the previous section, 
the mid-2000s were the most successful period 
in terms of fiscal performance in the recent 
economic history. However, even in this year, 
Figure 2
Primary Balance and interest exPenditures
Source: Turkish Ministry of Treasury and Finance
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the index value is less than one corresponding 
to a speculative fiscal posture which does not 
guarantee fiscal solvency in the medium term. 
In the following years until the global crisis, 
the index value follows a downward trend 
indicating a weakening fiscal quality and rising 
fiscal fragility. 
During the global crisis, the index plunged 
abruptly since fiscal balances were to large 
extent financed by foreign resources which 
is a serious source of vulnerability for the 
economy. The 50% decline in the index value 
in 2009 proves that the Turkish fiscal balances 
are indeed fragile and for this reason, external 
shocks pose a great deal of risk for fiscal 
stability since the Turkish Lira is not classified 
as an international reserve currency. Since 
the domestic currency has no sovereignty in 
the international markets, the government 
is impeded to borrow in foreign currencies 
which has impairing effects on the economy 
especially when the borrowing requirements 
are high as in the case of most developing 
economies. Hence, for countries like Turkey, 
preserving the ability to finance its budget 
through its own tools and generate primary 
surpluses on a continuous basis is crucial so 
as to generate a seamless influx of foreign 
capital under reasonable conditions. However, 
as illustrated on the Figure 3, in the recent 
years Turkey is gradually losing this capability 
despite considerable recovery after the global 
crisis. The continuous decline of the fragility 
index value is visible on the Figure 3. 
The fiscal sturdiness is clearly worsening 
in the recent years as evidenced by the 
Figure 3
PuBlic Financial Fragility index  
(Budget execution data)
Source: own calculations
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findings above. In other words, how the 
fiscal performance of the country measures 
up against its past achievements is portrayed 
on the Figure 3 and it is clear that recently 
it is heading towards an unsustainable 
fiscal posture. The reasons for the unending 
decline in the fiscal stability include political 
instabilities, rising military expenditures, 
contingent liability schemes, diminishing 
tax base and malfunctioning fiscal policies 
including increasing fiscal profligacy. The 
unpleasant trend in the fiscal fragility index 
is also evidenced by the Figure 4 which plots 
the values of the fragility index calculated with 
borrowing requirements data.
The data used for this variant of the index 
exclude the debt amortization expenditures 
and financial revenues therefore the values 
are different from the previous version and 
it exhibits an even gloomier portrait for the 
fiscal quality of the country. According to the 
Figure 4, Turkey is already in a Ponzi context 
which indicates that it can only finance its 
existing debt with new borrowing in short 
maturities which is obviously not sustainable. 
Nevertheless, regardless of the point values of 
each index, the recent declining trend is visible 
on both graphs. The economic fluctuations 
and vulnerabilities of the 90s were to some 
extent resolved in the early 2000s however, 
the optimistic economic recovery has initially 
been put on pause before the global crisis in 
2009 and thereafter have not been restored 
again. Compared to volatile and pessimistic 
Figure 4
PuBlic Financial Fragility index  
(Borrowing requirements data)
Source: own calculations
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conditions in the 90s, the recent outlook of 
the fiscal balances is not far-off in terms of 
stability. The economy has already passed 
'Minsky Moment' and is systematically heading 
towards an ultra-Ponzi financing which 
is extremely hazardous for fiscal balances. 
Nonexistence of a sufficient safety margin 
emits signals for a looming default in the 
medium term should no suitable expedients 
are employed in a timely manner. 
As we mentioned earlier, according to Terra 
et al. (2020), the public financial fragility 
index can also be used to determine the type 
of fiscal policy employed. In other words, the 
cyclicality of the fiscal policies can be found 
out (pro or countercyclical) by analysing the 
coexistence of economic growth and index 
values. Since Turkey was not under a hedge 
fiscal posture but speculative and Ponzi 
postures throughout the sample which was 
coexisting with economic growth for the 
majority of the observation years, it can be 
concluded that the fiscal policy in Turkey is 
chiefly procyclical during this period. The 
GDP growth rate was negative only in 1994, 
1999, 2001 and 2009 in Turkey according to 
IMF data and in the rest of the years of the 
sample positive growth rates was coinciding 
with speculative financing which makes the 
procyclical in terms of fiscal policy design. The 
procyclicality implies that during the phases 
of economic expansion, the government is 
devoting more resources in transfer payments 
due to politico-economic preferences instead 
of expanding the accumulation of reserves for 
future challenges. According to Alesina et al. 
(2008), in developing countries procyclical 
fiscal policies are common. The voters demand 
more tax cut and higher transfer payments 
during economic booms as they have limited 
confidence on the future course of fiscal 
policies conducted by the government. They 
are mostly not confident that the portion of 
the income reserved for future challenges will 
not be used for this particular purpose but 
instead will be wasted by the government. 
Hence, during periods of economic growth, 
they demand more transfer payments and 
lower taxes which results in lower primary 
balance to keep public debt under control. 
During the last decade, this scenario was to a 
large extent prevalent in fiscal policy design. 
As we mentioned in the theoretical section, 
according to Minsky the fiscal policy needs to 
be countercyclical to stabilise the economy by 
constituting the transition from speculative 
to hedge fiscal postures but in Turkey, the 
fiscal policy was procyclical during the last 
two decades. In recent years, insufficient 
tax revenues along with heightened transfer 
payments and contingent liabilities have 
culminated in a fragile and delicate public 
finance posture reminiscent of the 90s as a 
result of procyclical fiscal policies. 
CoNCLuSioN
It is evident from the analysis of two different 
versions of the financial fragility index that 
Turkish fiscal posture has been gradually 
diverging from the speculative posture in the 
recent years and currently is in a Ponzi fiscal 
regime which depletes all the safety margins 
of the fiscal system. Implications of this 
type of fiscal posture include borrowing in 
short maturities and at high financial costs, 
reduced credibility, higher and immediate 
borrowing requirements, reduced fiscal space 
and reduced manoeuvrability of the budget 
for transfer payments and other current 
expenses. Since fiscal stability is inherently 
a forward-looking concept, preserving the 
current status of a posture once achieved is 
as important as effectuating stability at the 
beginning. However, recently, Turkey has 
not performed well in this regard and fiscal 
stability appears to be fading out gradually. 
 FOCUS – Economic/financial risks and sustainability 
512  Public Finance Quarterly  2020/4
The primary balance was positive for more 
than 20 years but contrastingly consecutive 
negative primary balances are recorded in the 
last years which is a clear sign for a decline in 
fiscal strength of the country in terms of debt 
management. Besides, the public financial 
fragility index values calculated in our study 
are heading towards negativity indicating a 
transition in the direction of extreme fragility. 
Negative values of the fiscal fragility index 
imply Ponzi type fiscal posture which is not 
sustainable since it is by definition based on 
new borrowing on every round instead of 
revenue generation which is a stairway to 
financial default as a result of compounding 
and never-decreasing interest payments and 
debt accumulation. Also, negative values of the 
index coexist with economic growth periods 
which indicates that the government is not 
making use of expanding revenues and does 
not accumulate reserves for future financial 
challenges. This type of fiscal policy is called 
procyclical and is common in developing 
countries since those countries are not far-
sighted in fiscal management due to politico-
economic preferences. However, Minsky states 
that the government should be in surplus at 
least sporadically and pursue countercyclical 
policies to avoid financial crises but according 
to our findings, Turkey is not following these 
type of policies which further increases the 
level of fiscal vulnerability.
Reversing the ongoing downward trend 
in the fiscal fragility index entails numerous 
measures and policy alterations which might 
have painful social costs as well as economic 
sacrifices. However, a back-loading fiscal 
adjustment might reduce the associated social 
costs since it spreads the fiscal costs over time, 
unlike front-loading adjustment which aims 
at generating desired outcomes immediately at 
higher social costs. The indicated back-loading 
adjustment package should rely heavily on 
spending cuts rather than tax hiking which is 
less harmful to society. Systematic spending 
cuts, however, entail proper and transparent 
scrutiny of existing expenditures so as to 
reduce profligacy which is crucial for restoring 
stability. Also, contingent liabilities involving 
infrastructure investments appear to be 
an inordinate fiscal burden on the budget 
therefore restructuring the current contingent 
liability schemes might reduce government 
expenditures dramatically. In addition, the 
constantly postponed tax reform should be 
implemented promptly, besides, widening 
the tax base and reducing the portion of 
indirect taxes should be the major tenets of the 
prospective tax reform. 
Nevertheless, since the Covid-19 pandemic 
has recently proven to be an enormous 
impediment for economic activities all around 
the world, even the proper implementation of 
these strategies might not result in the desired 
recovery in fiscal balances. Developing countries 
including Turkey were caught off-guard by 
the pandemic, therefore, rapidly rising health 
expenditures and plummeting government 
revenues hinder fiscal recovery regardless of 
the policy action taken by the government. 
The already shallow fiscal space is insufficient 
to cover the immediate financing needs of the 
Covid-19 which exacerbates the fiscal stress 
even further. Hence, a swift restoration of fiscal 
stability appears to be unlikely to occur in the 
near future due to harsh conditions imposed 
jointly by the malfunctioning fiscal system and 
the current pandemic. 
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